MEMORY AND THE SENSE OF SELF
ON THE ROLE OF MEMORY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
FROM ANTIQUITY TO GIAMBATTISTA VICO

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(click here for first page)
One of the first fruits of the transfer of the Warburg Institute from Germany to England before the second world war was a remarkable little book by one of the most stimulating, but now, alas, scarcely appreciated art-historical minds of that generation, Roger Hinks (died 1963). Hinks’s *Myth and Allegory in Ancient Art* was first presented as a series of lectures at the Warburg Institute in 1935. Hinks was deeply affected by the teachings of Ernst Cassirer and the Warburg School and the main thrust of the work is to analyze the way the Greeks represented reality symbolically, shifting from unconscious myth to explicit allegory. He associated this process with the gradual detachment of the individual consciousness from the total consciousness of the social group, a process that distinguished Greek civilization from any other. The book’s three chapters define and trace this development in three basic contexts. The first chapter is devoted to the symbolic representation of the natural order, that is, the universe of space and time, the second is devoted to the social order, and the last to what Hinks calls the mental order.

Hinks himself was interested primarily in classical civilization, and the main focus of his attention is on the emergence of rational modes of thought in antiquity. The theme of his last chapter, however, seems to me of fundamental importance to the historian of art who seeks to

* This paper, first presented as one of the series of Slade lectures delivered at Oxford University in March, 1989, is the preliminary version of the introduction to a volume of essays I am preparing, entitled *The Art of Commemoration in the Renaissance*. Some of the important secondary sources I have used are listed at the end of the essay.
understand how this classical legacy of symbolic representation became the visual culture of the
western.

The essential point of Hinks’s third chapter is to establish the insoluble bond between
memory and civilization. It is the possession of a memory that makes man an historical being, and
it is his capacity for being historical that gives him a personality. The emergence of memory and
the evolution of personality are two aspects of a single phenomenon, namely, the detachment of
the self-conscious individual from the group. The central, irrational core of man’s
self-consciousness, his individuality, was symbolized in antiquity by the notion of the daemon, or
genius. This spirit-of-the-self expressed, in effect, the relationship between memory and
personality. Hinks had the insight to realize further that inner self-awareness was expressed
visually through representations of the dialogue taking place between a man and his daemon,
notably in images of practitioners of the various arts inspired by their respective muses (Figs. 1,
2). The role of memory in the definition of human consciousness in such depictions, is implicit in
the fact that memory itself, personified as Mnemosyne, was conceived as the mother of the muses
through her union with Zeus, the father of the gods.

Hinks did not explore, indeed, I suspect he did not perceive, the implications of his analysis
of the development of symbolic visual thought for an understanding of the operation of historical
tradition as such. Yet, I believe the idea of interdependence between memory and personality
provides a valuable insight into the paradoxical union of retrospection and innovation, of
historicism and modernism, that characterizes the Renaissance. The forms of symbolic
representation developed in antiquity could serve by their very nature as signs of awareness by
which one’s own awareness could be gauged. References to classical prototypes constituted not
only an act of memory and homage but also an act of self assertion. This process differs from the
one described by Hinks since it involves an additional level of awareness, in which the past is explicitly distinguished from and conceived as subservient to both the present and the future.

The point of departure for my interest in the subject is an historical and historiographical paradox to which, whether consciously or not, we have been heir since the Renaissance. One of the cornerstones of modern historiography is that the basic organization of historical time into three divisions or periods, ancient, medieval, and modern, was an achievement of the Renaissance. The notion of there having been a distant, ancient classical civilization that was destroyed by the establishment of Christianity and the barbarian invasions, resulting in a cultural decadence that was in turn succeeded by a new contemporary time in which the ancient world is reborn—this historical structure can be traced ultimately to Petrarch in the mid-fourteenth century. The paradox to which I refer consists in the simultaneous emergence, on the one hand, of a fixed, perspective view of a distant part, and, on the other hand, of a sense of the present as a new, distinctly modern era in the definition of which the past plays an essential role. This way of thinking about history can be seen as a reflection of the dual nature of the Renaissance itself, which while looking back to antiquity for authority, also found license to body forth something new. There was in fact a twofold break with medieval tradition—a leapfrog return to an ideal golden age in the remote past, and an equal and opposite thrust forward toward an ideal future based on current achievements and ambitions.

It is a remarkable fact that although the retrospective and innovative aspects of the Renaissance have often been studied separately, the relationship between these two terms of the paradox has not been brought clearly into focus. By and large, the Renaissance interest in the past has been conceived alternatively as essential and intellectual, or as incidental and social. In the first case, the revival of ancient culture is seen more or less as an end in itself, the character of the
Renaissance determined mainly by progressively greater liberation from medieval convention and increasingly complete assimilation of classical values. In the second conception, the essence of the Renaissance lay in the development of a new social order, of which the revival of antiquity was merely a symptom, the outward mask of an increasingly secularized attitude toward the world.

In the essential, intellectual view, what was new about the Renaissance was its retrospection. This attitude received its most concise and compelling formulation in Erwin Panofsky’s famous definition of the Renaissance achievement as the reintegration of classical form with classical content. Panofsky observed that the classical heritage was never completely lost in the Middle Ages, but that when ancient personages occurred in art, for example, they were shown either as contemporaries or in some exotic guise; and, conversely, when classical forms occurred they would be given some contemporary or quite alien meaning. Panofsky’s definition was based on the notion of historical distance, that is, a sense of remoteness that made it possible to dissociate ancient culture from the strictures and disapprobation of Christianity. In Panofsky’s definition the revival is self-contained as well as essential, since reintegration of classical form and meaning is a self-sufficient and self-justifying process, akin to and in many ways precedent for our own "scientific" historical attitude which makes reconstructing the past an end in itself.

The view of Renaissance interest in antiquity as an incidental symptom of a new social order was represented by Jacob Burckhardt, notably in the opening paragraphs of the chapter on the revival of antiquity in his Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. Burckhardt is at pains to emphasize, as one of the chief propositions of his book, that the conquest of the western world was achieved not through the revival of antiquity alone, but through its union with what he calls the genius of the Italian people. Burckhardt goes on to observe that the degree of independence which the national spirit maintained in this union varied according to circumstances. In the modern Latin
literature of the period, he says, it was very small, while in plastic art, as well as in other spheres, it was remarkably great. In this book Burckhardt does not actually deal with the visual arts, but he says in the general introduction he had intended to fill the gap by a special work on "The Art of the Renaissance." Of course, Burckhardt did write a great deal about art, and if one takes the wonderful series of lectures on Renaissance sculpture as an example, one is indeed astonished by the passion with which he describes the originality of and independence from classical tradition displayed by the Italian masters through the High Renaissance. Time and time again he stresses, often with very subtle observations the effects of form and emotion, the differences between the Italian works and their classical antecedents. The explanation he gives for the Renaissance enthusiasm for antiquity was that it reflected a social revolution in which the noble and the burger came together on equal terms, so that a society developed which felt the need for culture and had the leisure and the means to obtain it. Antiquity then became the guide, leading the way from the fantasy world of the Middle Ages to an understanding of the actual physical and intellectual world.

In my view, neither of these attitudes helps to resolve the paradox of the Renaissance, the coincidence of a new sense of the past with a new sense of the present; neither perceives an inner, organic and necessary relation between retrospection and innovation. In my view, we must explore the possibilities of an alternate understanding of the attitude toward the past which emerged in the Renaissance, not as an end in itself, nor as merely a symptom of change in social structure, but rather as an essential ingredient in the radical redefinition of the self that is signified by the modern conception of modernity.

I am convinced that such a relationship existed, and I believe it functioned in two ways. One kind of role the past may be said to have played in the definition of the present was *exemplary*: the past was seen as a model to be imitated, the prestige of the prototype serving as justification
for a claim to attention and admiration made by the imitation. The second use of the past was *agonistic*, reference to some esteemed prototype serving not only as a witness to the ambition of the present but also as a measure of the difference between the model and its reflection. In this case the achievements of the past become a foil for the originality of the present and, in turn, a measure of the challenge raised to the future. The historical reference becomes evidence of the lesson of history having been mastered and incorporated into a new and surpassing synthesis.

Perhaps the point of view I suggest is obvious, yet it seems to me the only angle from which essential aspects of the Renaissance uses of the past can be fully grasped. Certainly this approach can help to obviate a fundamental fallacy that besets the recent vogue for explaining Renaissance art criticism in terms of classical rhetoric. Many practitioners of this powerful analytic technique make one basic, but to my mind quite unnecessary assumption. Because Renaissance criticisms of art were full of stock motifs, topoi appropriated from ancient writers, such statements must signify nothing but an empty rhetoric devoid of sincere meaning. It is argued by Michael Baxandall in his *Giotto and the Orators* (1971), for example, that we should not take as a considered opinion Filippo Villani’s claim that Giotto is to be preferred to the artists of antiquity, because Filippo also claimed that Pagolo de’Dagomari surpassed all ancient and modern astronomers and even compared the modern comedian Gonella with those of antiquity. Yet, it is precisely the passage about comedians, read in its context, that demonstrates Villani’s seriousness. He disarms the opposite possibility at the outset by saying explicitly that although it might seem ridiculous to include comedians among the great men of Florence, yet the example of the ancients bears witness to the wonder and nobility of the comic art. The reference to the classical model, far from undermining the sincerity of Villani’s opinion, serves on the contrary to sanction his expressing a considered judgment in a matter that might at first thought seem unworthy of such
consideration; the classical appreciation of comedians also serves to confirm the validity of Villani’s appreciation of his own contemporaries. Failure to perceive the positive, inner connection between reference to the past and definition of the present has created a glaring historical and conceptual void that needs to be filled.

We may begin to do so, I think, by considering the very notion of memory, since it focuses explicitly on man’s understanding of his relationship to the past, and since its history in some respects runs parallel to my own argument. I am concerned with memory itself, needless to say, not with memory technique, the theme admirably studied by Frances Yates in her seminal book, *The Art of Memory*: the art of memorization impinges on the art of commemorization only tangentially, since history may provide the content of mnemonics but not the subject.

The essence of the relationship between memory and personal identity that Hinks ascribed to the ancient Greeks is expressed in a story told by Diogenes Laertes about Pythagoras, who traced his lineage back through a series of reincarnations to the god Hermes. Hermes offered his son Aethalides, the ancestor of Pythagoras, any gift except immortality. Aethalides chose the next best thing, to retain the memory of his experiences through life and death. In this way, Aethalides was able to establish his identity and preserve it in succeeding generations, so as to achieve the kind of cumulative immortality that is conferred on man alone by his awareness of his own past.

The idea of an existence before and after death that underlies Pythagoras’s story was a basic determinant in Plato’s view of memory. Physical reality is but the shadow of the realm of pure and abstract ideas that are eternal and instilled in every man when the soul enters the body, but are forgotten at birth. For Plato, then, the process of learning or knowing and that of remembering are virtually the same. Human self-awareness, the Socratean "Know thyself," is a matter of reapprehending the innate prototypical ideas. Plato is careful to distinguish between
simple memory, that is, a record imprinted on the passive soul by sense perceptions, and recollection or reminiscence, which is a higher act of the spirit.

Aristotle took up the distinction between memory and recollection but shifted it to an entirely new context. For Aristotle, there are no innate ideas and man’s only source of knowledge is through the senses. Not only memory but thought itself is based on images formed in the mind by perceptions from the outside world. Aristotle conceives of memory as one of four powers of the soul. The common sense is the capacity of the soul to receive and conjoin perceptions derived from the various physical senses into a common image. The imagination is the capacity to store, recall, reconstruct or distort images derived from the senses. Memory at its lower level involves the capacity man shares with animals to relate the image imprinted in the imagination to the original perception: at its upper level, unique to man, memory is the power of reminiscence, that is, the capacity to recall and relate past images consciously and purposefully. The fourth and highest power of man’s soul, still derived from sense perceptions, is reason. The physician Galen adapted the definitions of Aristotle and took an important step by attributing the powers to the brain, partly to its substance and partly to its three main cavities, the ventricles.

It has been said that there took place during the Middle Ages a merger of traditions concerning memory stemming from different strains of classical thought about human nature—philosophical, psychological, physiological, religious and ethical. The merger brought three major developments in the interpretation of memory that may be described as internalization, localization, and moralization. The first involved the distinction between the external and the internal senses. The external senses—vision, hearing, touch, etc.—derive from the organs through which the stimuli of the outer world are perceived. The inward senses—a term first used by St. Augustine—are the functions of the soul that process these perceptions by performing the three
basic functions of receiving, digesting and storing the information transmitted by the external senses.

It was another Christian author of the mid-fourth century, Bishop Nemesius of Emesa, who first propounded the theory of localized brain functions that was to provide the basic framework for psychological speculation for centuries to come. Nemesius confined the faculties entirely to the ventricles, thus completing the process of internalization and, it might be said, spiritualization of man’s mental processes.

In its simplest form the localization theory, partly based on the experimental evidence of brain damage, distributed sensation, reason and memory respectively to the front, middle and rear ventricles. In its most complete form, incorporating the distinctions and refinements of the Arabic physicians Averroes and Avicenna, the theory defined a total of six internal senses. The common sense merged information coming from the external senses into a coherent image. Imagination retained the incoming perceptions and made them available for combination with other perceptions in order to form images not actually perceived. This latter, combinatory capacity was sometimes called the fantasy. A fourth faculty was known usually as the estimative power in reference to the soul’s capacity to grasp the “intention” or meaning of an image, as the sheep grasps the fearsomeness of the wolf and runs away; in this respect the estimative faculty was a form of judgment. The fifth power of the soul was that of memory proper, which stores the images together with their intentions and makes them available to reminiscence. Finally, there was the motive power, which effected the action to be taken in response to the stimuli. (Figs. 3, 4)

The third, moral or ethical aspect of memory also had its origins in antiquity. It might be said that Plato’s interest in memory was primarily metaphysical since it provided a link between everyday experience and the prototypical ideas that constitute the ultimate reality. Aristotle,
instead, thought of memory primarily in psychological terms, as part of the functional mechanism of the mind. The most important Roman thinker on the subject of memory, Cicero, followed Plato’s views in his *Tusculan Disputations* on philosophical themes, but in his works on rhetoric, the *De Oratore* and the *De Inventione*, Cicero introduced a fundamental shift in emphasis. Here memory is considered in an essentially practical context, as a tool of the orator, and is included as one of the five parts of rhetoric, along with invention, disposition, elocution and pronunciation. Memory in this sense is part of a technique that involves retaining the main points or even the very words of a speech. Memory forms part of the orator’s persuasive equipment and hence acquires a strong ethical component. In a famous passage in the *De Inventione* on the purposes of oratory, Cicero defines the four parts of Virtue: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance—the cardinal virtues in the Middle Ages. Memory, as the faculty of the mind that recalls the past, is defined as one of the three parts of the virtue of providence, along with intelligence, the faculty of ascertaining the present, and Prudence, the faculty of predicting the future. In this way, Cicero links man’s relation to the past to a moral code.

There can be little doubt that Cicero, or at least the Platonic tradition to which he adhered, was a major source for the interpretation offered by St. Augustine. Augustine’s conception of memory is “theological,” and results from his conception of the soul itself as a reflection of the Trinity. The soul, he says, possesses three powers, Memory, Understanding and Will. Memory contains the images of sense perceptions, of all knowledge, and the affections of the mind, hence it holds the key to self knowledge. Augustine thus extends the function of memory to self-consciousness itself, and ultimately to God. When Augustine looked into his memory, he said, he found God there, since knowledge of the divine is innate.
The moral nature of memory is apparent especially in Augustine’s conception of Christian eloquence, which he sharply distinguished from pagan rhetoric. The latter was concerned primarily with logic and the emotional appeal of language: Christian eloquence, instead, was defined as the exposition of the truth of the Bible. In this way, too, memory, insofar as it is part of rhetoric, takes on a moral cast far more specific and concrete than in Cicero, in that it becomes a primary instrument for the salvation of souls. Finally, as we shall see, Augustine also adapted the tradition of ventricular localization to his own theory, placing perception at the front, memory in the middle and emotion in the rear cavity.

The shift in emphasis from the ancient conception of memory as an essentially metaphysical-psychological mental capacity to the medieval notion of memory as a powerful moral force is evident in the form and context in which the personification of memory was represented. A rare ancient instance of a depiction of memory in which the figure is identifiable through an inscription, occurs on a white ground lekythos, where Mnemosyne stands holding a rotulus next to one of her daughters, Calliope, who is shown seated playing a lyre (Fig. 5). In other words, memory is portrayed strictly as the recorder of the past and in her capacity as mother of the muses, whose activities depend on her. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the role given to memory in one of the great works of allegorical literature of the late Middle Ages, Guillaume de Degeuileville’s *Pelerinage de la vie humaine*, a composition whose very title indicates its basic concern with man’s nature in relation to his purpose. The section involving memory describes how the soul arms itself against the deceitful attacks of the devil that will assail it in the course of its journey to the Heavenly Jerusalem. Grace Dieu, the soul’s guide, offers the armor of virtue—the mailed coat of fortitude, the helmet of temperance the scabbard of humility, the shield of prudence, etc. (Fig. 6). The pilgrim balks at having to carry such heavy equipment on his journey (Fig. 7),
and the Grace of God comes to his rescue by summoning his Memory (Fig. 8). Lady Memory, portrayed in a late fourteenth-century manuscript as an elegant young woman with eyes at the back of her head, then proceeds to accompany him through life as his armor-bearer (Fig. 9). It is thus memory, as the repository of the virtues vested in the soul by God’s grace, that vouchsafes the salvation of mankind.

The role of memory in salvation is also illustrated in an early fifteenth century manuscript of a mythological treatise by John Ridewall, which provides a Christian allegorical interpretation of classical mythology (Fig. 10). Ridewall associates the gods with Christian virtues based on Cicero’s description of prudence as consisting of memory, intelligence and foresight. Juno is identified with memory, and given many attributes: her primary role, however, is in the recollection of sin, which leads to repentance and thus to reconciliation with God.

It will have become evident that the process of moralization entailed a conception of memory as an active force in the scheme of salvation, rather than simply a passive repository in the life of the mind. This species of activated memory actually had a physiological counterpart in the one deviant strain that may be discovered in the dominant medieval localization theory described earlier—quantitatively minor but doggedly persistent and in the end of great importance. In his commentary on Genesis, Augustine speaks of a medical theory that the three ventricles of the brain contain, in the first, sensations, in the second, the memory, and in the third, motion; the latter two faculties are thus reversed with respect to the norm. Augustine explains this distribution by observing that motion follows sensation and man must therefore be able to relate what he is about to do to what he has done in the past. In this way, memory is given a central and active role in the mental processes. Memory becomes a determining factor in the formulation of the soul’s response to its environment. Augustine’s account was almost completely eclipsed during most of
the Middle Ages but his formulation was taken up again at the turn of the fourteenth century with
the great Augustinian revival centered in the Order of Augustinian hermits. The best known
member of the group was Egidius Romanus, Giles of Rome (1247-1316), general of the order and
friend of Pope Boniface VIII. Giles sought to reconcile Augustine’s views with those of Avicenna
by dividing the functions of the third ventricle into two parts and locating memory in the front of
that cavity with the motive power in the rear. In this way, Giles was able to include the memory in
the third ventricle and yet retain its intermediate position between the other senses and the motive
power. Giles’s influence passed into the heart of the Renaissance through his later namesake and
editor, Giles of Viterbo, the close associate and advisor of Popes Julius II and Leo X. The
arrangement he described was illustrated two centuries later in a printed edition of a tract by the
Augustinian hermit Agostino Trionfo of Ancona, published in Bologna in 1503 (Fig. 11). The
same tradition is illustrated in England in the early seventeenth century by Robert Fludd (Fig. 12).

I can offer no better illustration of the profound change in the conception of memory that
occurred in the Renaissance than to cite two poems, one by Petrarch, the other by Michelangelo.
Both poems embody nearly all the themes involving memory and self-definition with which I am
preoccupied in these lectures. The sonnet by Petrarch is one of his best known, since it is thought
to have been addressed to Cola di Rienzo, whom Petrarch for a time regarded as the potential
savior of Rome. The poet invokes that noble spirit (spirto gentil) who he hopes will awaken Italy
from her long slumber and raise her again to her ancient glory. In the first stanza the spirit is said
to rule the limbs (membra) of that gallant lord. Two stanzas later the word membra becomes part
of a play on words with remember: the ancient walls, which the world still remembers, the stones
that contained the members of famous men—all await salvation.

Spirto gentil, che quelle membra reggi
Dentro a le qua’ peregrinando alberga
un signor valoroso, accorto a saggio,
L’antiche mura ch’ancor teme et ama
E trema ‘1 mondo, quando si rimembra
Del tempo andato e’n dietro si rivolve,
E i sassi dove fûr chiuse le membri
Di tal che non saranno senza fama
Se l’universo pria non si dissolve,

(O gentle spirit who those members rule
Inside which like a pilgrim dwelt and trod
A gallant lord, discerning and wise)

The ancient walls that the world fears and loves
Still, and trembles, recalling to its mind
The time that was, turning to give a glance
And the stones where were closed in and confined
The limbs of some of whom honour approves,
Unless the universe fall to mischance,)

The evocation of the past through its once glorious monuments and heroes, as well as the exhortation of the ideal ruler to fulfill his destiny by emulating the past—the very process whereby society may be redeemed—is couched in terms of memory, whose operation is mimicked by the echo of the rhyming words for disparate parts (membra) and recollection (remembra).

In Petrarch’s sonnet this interplay between meaning and sound on the theme of memory, is dispersed and largely immersed in a series of complex metaphors that make up the whole, eight-stanza work. Two centuries later Michelangelo Buonarroti, doubtless inspired by Petrarch’s poem, realized the potential latent in the same pun, which he brought into focus, distilled and compressed into just eight lines of verse (italics mine):

Molto diletta al gusto intero a sano
l’opra della prim’arte, the n’assembra
i volti a gli atti, a con piu vive membri,
di cera o terra o pietra un corp’umano.

Se po’ ‘l tempo ingiurioso, aspro a villano
la rompe o storce o del tutto dismembra,
la belta the prim’era si rimembra,
e serba a miglior loco il placer vano.
(Rime 237)

(There is much joy for just and perfect taste
In work of the first art, when it assembles
From gestures, face, and the liveliest members,
A human body in stone or clay or wax.

If time thereafter, hurtful, harsh and base,
Breaks it, or twists, or thoroughly dismembers,
The beauty earlier there he still remembers,
And keeps the vain joy for a better place.
Gilbert and Linscott 235)

Time is again the villain, memory the savior, and the goal an ideal future. There are two important differences, however, apart from Michelangelo’s brilliant sequence of images related by both rhyme and meaning, crammed into a few verses. Michelangelo’s train of thought reflects the Platonic-Augustinian tradition of memory as a recollection of the realm of innate ideas, in this case the idea of Beauty, to which the soul may return in the afterlife. Equally important in our context, however, is the role given to the memory through the sequence of puns: memory reassembles, as it were, the *disjecta membra* left by the ruinous passage of time. To a far greater degree than in Petrarch, memory has been transformed from a passive receptacle into an active participant in the creative working of the mind.

Subsequently this sense of memory as an essential part of a vital process came almost to undermine some of the traditional distinctions among the faculties. Hobbes, for example, emphasized that imagination, in its original meaning as the impression left by sensations when they reach the common sense, is really the same thing as memory. If we focus on experience itself, we refer to the imagination; if we focus on the pastness of experience, we call it memory. In the
eighteenth century that eccentric but deeply prophetic pre-modernist Giambattista Vico drew this line of thought to its logical conclusion by virtually identifying memory and imagination: All images are based on the senses and we neither imagine without remembering, nor do we remember without the images produced by the senses. The Latins, Vico said, referred to the faculty by which we create images as memoria and what the Greeks called fantasy the Italians called imagination. In fact, Vico says, the Italian "immaginare" corresponds to the Latin "memorare." Elsewhere, he observes that fantasy is nothing more than memory, either extended or composite, an efflorescence of reminiscences.

These psychological considerations are of fundamental importance to Vico’s historical sense. In primitive times, he says, before the invention of writing and the development of abstract thought, the principle concern was with memory, which was the primary operation of the mind. Hence, the ancients were correct in referring to memory as the mother of the Muses. Vico emphasizes this argument especially in the section of his Nuova Scienza dealing with the discovery of the true Homer. Poetry at this early stage was not separable from history; poetry preserved in the memories of the people that the nations became conscious of their own past and hence of their identities. In part, Vico is here clearly borrowing from the close association between memory and the Muses (inspiration) in the traditional evocations of the epic poets—Virgil, who asks the Muse to remind him of the causes of the fateful events he describes; and Dante, who links to the Muses his own "alto ingegno" and his memory in describing the Inferno. Yet, Vico seems to have gone beyond this relationship and incorporated as well the role of memory, both as a simple evocation of past events, and as a source ofimaginings and ideas in the manner described by Shakespeare in the passage in Love’s Labor’s Lost with which I shall conclude these preliminary ruminations. I
might have quoted the passage at the outset, but then there would have been no point in giving the lecture:

This is a gift I have simple: simple, a foolish extravagant spirit, full of forms, figures, shapes, objects, ideas, apprehensions, motions, revolutions. These are begot in the ventricle of memory, nourished in the womb of Pia Mater, and delivered upon the mellowing of occasion. (IV, II, 81f.)
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Fig. 1  St. Mark inspired by his "Muse" (Sophia?). Codex Rossanensis, fol. 121, Rossano.

Fig. 2  David inspired by "Melodia." Paris Psalter, MS Gr. 139, fol.1, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

Fig. 3  "Disease man" with diagram of the brain cells (sensus communis, cellula ymagina. cella estimativa vel rationis, cella memoriav). ca. 1400. MS lat 11229, fol. 37v, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (after E. Clarke and K. Dewhurst, An Illustrated History of Brain Function, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972, fig. 7.)

Fig. 4  Diagram of perception and brain function (sensu communi, ymaginativa. Estimacio, memoracio, cogitacio, pia mater, dura mater), 1367. John Pecham, Perspectiva communis, MS 5210, fol. 56v, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna (after Clarke and Dewhurst, fig. 65).

Fig. 5  Mnemosyne and Calliope. White ground lekythos (after Monumenti antichi, XVII, 1906, pl. XXVI).

Fig. 6  Grace Dieu shows the pilgrim a suit of armor, 1393. Guillaume de Deguilville, Pelerinage de vie humaine, MS fr. 823, fol. 27, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

Fig. 7  The pilgrim throws off his suit of armor. Guillaume de Deguilville, Pelerinage de vie humaine, MS fr. 823, fol. 34, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

Fig. 8  Grace Dieu introduces Lady Memory to the pilgrim. Guillaume de Deguilville, Pelerinage de vie humaine, MS fr. 823, fol. 34v, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

Fig. 9  Lady Memory takes up the pilgrim’s armor. Guillaume de Deguilville, Pelerinage de vie humaine, MS fr. 823, fol. 27, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

Fig. 10  Juno-Mercury, early fifteenth century. John Ridewall, Fulgentius Metaforalis, MS Palat. lat. 1066, fol. 223v, Biblioteca Vaticana, Rome.

Fig. 11  The ventricles of the brain (sensu communis ymaginativa, fantasia/extimativa, memoria/motiva). Agostino Trionfo, Opusculum de cognitione animae, ed. A. Achillini, Bologna, 1503, sig. f.viii (after Clarke and Dewhurst, fig. 34).

Fig. 12  Diagram of brain functions and cosmology (sensitiva-imaginativa, cogitativa-aestimativa, memorativa-motiva). R. Fludd, Utriusque cosmi maioris scilicet et minoris, metaphysica, physica atque technica historia, 2 vols., Oppenheim, 1617-21, II, sect. 1, 217 (after Clarke and Dewhurst, fig. 57).
Fig. 1  St. Mark inspired by his "Muse" (Sophia?). Codex Rossanensis, fol. 121, Rossano.
Fig. 2  David inspired by "Melodia." Paris Psalter, MS Gr. 139, fol.1, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
Fig. 3 "Disease man" with diagram of the brain cells (*sensus communis, cellula ymagina, cellula estimativa vel rationis, cella memoria*) ca. 1400. MS lat. 11229, fol. 37v, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (after E. Clarke and K. Dewhurst, *An Illustrated History of Brain Function*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972, fig. 7).
Fig. 4  Diagram of perception and brain function (sensus communis, ymaginati[v]a. Estimacio, memoracio, cogitacio, pia mater, dura mater), 1367. John Pecham, Perspectiva communis, MS 5210, fol. 56v, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna (after Clarke and Dewhurst, fig. 65).

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Fig. 5 Mnemosyne and Calliope. White ground lekythos (after Monumenti antichi, XVII, 1906, pl. XXVI).
Fig. 6 Grace Dieu shows the pilgrim a suit of armor, 1393. Guillaume de Deguilville, *Pelerinage de vie humaine*, MS fr. 823, fol. 27, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

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Fig. 7 The pilgrim throws off his suit of armor. Guillaume de Deguilville, *Pelerinage de vie humaine*, MS fr. 823, fol. 34, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

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Fig. 8 Grace Dieu introduces Lady Memory to the pilgrim. Guillaume de Deguilville, *Pelerinage de vie humaine*, MS fr. 823, fol. 34v, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

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Fig. 9  Lady Memory takes up the pilgrim’s armor. Guillaume de Deguilville, *Pelerinage de vie humaine*, MS fr. 823, fol. 35v, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

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Fig. 10 Juno-Mercury, early fifteenth century. John Ridewall, *Fulgentius Metaforalis*, MS Palat. lat. 1066, fol. 223v, Biblioteca Vaticana, Rome.

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Fig. 11 The ventricles of the brain (sensus communis/magi/nativ/a, fantasia/extimati/v/a, memoria/motiva). Agostino Trionfo, *Opusculum de cognitione animae*, ed. A. Achillini, Bologna, 1503, sig. f[viii] (after Clarke and Dewhurst, fig. 34).

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R. Fludd, Utriusque cosmi maioris scilicet et minoris, metaphysica, physica atque technica historia, 2 vols., Oppenheim, 1617-21, II, sect. 1, 217 (after Clarke and Dewhurst, fig. 57).

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